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Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The Obstruction of 
Justice Puzzle 
In federal criminal prosecutions, venue lies only in "a district in 
which the offense was committed." 1 This rule derives from the con-
stitutional guarantees of a trial "in the state where the said crimes 
shall have been committed,"2 and of a jury "of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed."3 When it was framed 
in the late eighteenth century, this "district-of-the-crime" test gener-
ally pointed to just one permissible place for trial - the ~istrict in 
which the accused was physically present at the time the crime was 
committed.4 Advances in communications and transportation and 
the expansion of federal criminal law have made it increasingly diffi-
cult to determine where, for the purpose of laying venue, a crime is 
"committed."5 The elements of a modem crime may be widely scat-
tered over time and space, and may not coincide with the physical 
presence of the person bearing criminal responsibility.6 
Because of these developments, venue is frequently litigated in 
I. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18 provides in its entirety: 
Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecution shall be had in 
a district in which the offense was committed. The court shall fix the place of trial within 
the district with due regard to the convenience of the defendant and the witnesses and the 
prompt administration of justice. 
Under the continuing offense statute, an offense which is "begun in one district and completed 
in another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any 
district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed." 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) 
(1976). 
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment does not provide for venue literally, but 
defines the "vicinage" from which jurors will be drawn. See Blume, The Place of Trial of 
Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REV. 59, 60 (1944). In prac-
tice, the sixth amendment has consistently been interpreted as guaranteeing trial in the district 
where the crime was committed. See, e.g., Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220 
(1956); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 364 (1912); In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257, 265 (1890); 
2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 301, al 190 (2d ed. 1982). 
4. See Kershen, Vicinage, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1977); Comment, Multi-Venue and 
the Obscenity Statutes, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 413 (1967). 
5. See SA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 18.02(2), at 18-14 (2d ed. 1983) ("The framers 
could not have contemplated a society with the mobility and complexity of ours, and the al-
most infinite variety of acts which have become criminally sanctioned."); Abrams, Conspiracy 
and Multi-Venue In Federal Criminal Prosecutions: 17ze Crime Committed Formula, 9 UCLA L. 
REV. 751, 752 (1962) (crimes with multidistrict contacts have become more common because 
of a variety of factors, "including improvements in long-distance communication and trans-
portation facilities . . . and the nature of crimes now covered by federal criminal laws"); 
Kershen, supra note 4, at 38 ("The assumption under which the constitutional draftsman had 
operated with respect to the locality of the crime had been invalidated by technological 
changes."). 
6. See Abrams, supra note 5, at 817; Kershen, supra note 4, at 38. The "elements" of a 
crime are those facts that the prosecution must prove lo obtain a conviction, including a pro-
scribed act, a culpable mental state, i. particular result, certain attendant circumstances, and 
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federal criminal cases.7 Although the Supreme Court has said that 
questions of criminal venue "raise deep issues of public policy,"8 no 
consistent view of that policy has been voiced.9 Instead, courts gener-
any independent facts needed to establish the jurisdiction of the court. See generally W. 
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 2, 16 (1972). 
Some early federal crimes by definition required the culprit to be physically present at the 
scene of events that were relatively circumscribed in time and space. See, e.g., Act of April 30, 
1790 ch. 9 § 11, l Stat. 112, 114 (1848)(concealing a pirate); Act of March 3, 1825 ch. 64 § 23, 4 
Stat. 102, 109 (1846) (now codified in modified form at 18 U.S.C. § 1706 (1976)) (injuring a 
bag used to carry mail). 
The Supreme Court rejected a physical presence test at an early date. See In re Palliser, 
136 U.S. 257, 265 (1890). More recent commentary has suggested that the locus of a crime 
should be construed "to be - if at all possible - where a defendant was physically present 
and acting at the time of the offense." Comment, supra note 4, at 423. Such a physical test 
would be of little use, however, in determining venue for a crime like price discrimination in 
the transportation of goods in interstate commerce. See 49 U.S.C. § 11903 (Supp. III 1979) 
(setting venue in any "district in which any part of the violation is committed or through which 
the transportation is conducted"); note 13 infra. 
7. In a recent 18-month period, the courts of one circuit alone decided venue issues in cases 
involving prosecutions for receiving payments from an employer in violation of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act, United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 331-33 (4th Cir. 1982) (venue lies where pro-
scribed act occurs or wherever commerce is affected); use of the mails to facilitate the 
importation of drugs, United States v. Lowry, 675 F.2d 593, 596 (4th Cir. 1982) (venue proper 
in any district through which the drugs move); obstruction of justice, United States v. Kibler, 
667 F.2d 452, 454-55 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982) (venue lies in district of 
obstructed judicial proceeding even where all acts of obstruction occur elsewhere); presenta-
tion of false claims to an agency of the U.S. government, United States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 
629, 632-33 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982) (venue may lie where claim is 
prepared, where it is delivered to the agency, or where it is given to an intermediary for deliv-
ery to the agency); willfully attempting to evade income taxes, United States v. Goodyear, 649 
F.2d 226, 228 (4th Cir. 1981) (prosecution stemming from failure to file 1971 tax return may be 
brought in district where, years later, defendant made false statements regarding income to 
IRS agents); and willfully causing a destructive substance to be placed on an aircraft, United 
States v. Bradley, 540 F. Supp. 690, 695 (D. Md. 1982) (where defendant put bomb into suit-
case of unsuspecting party, venue lies where innocent party brought bomb on board the plane, 
not in district in which the defendant acted). 
8. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944). 
9. In United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405 (1958), the Court stated that the venue provi-
sions are safeguards against the unfairness and hardship of prosecution in a place remote from 
the defendant's home. 356 U.S. at 407, 410; see also United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 
275 (1944). But in Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215 (1956), the majority found that 
"this requirement of venue states the public policy that fixes the situs of the trial in the vicinage 
of the crime rather than the residence of the accused." 351 U.S. at 220-21. This view, of 
course, merely restates the test without explaining the policy behind it. See also In re Palliser, 
136 U.S. 257, 265 (1890) (stating test without reference to policy). 
Justice Harlan advanced a more explicit rationale for the constitutional venue limitations 
in his dissent in Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961), where he noted that the "basic 
policy of the Sixth Amendment" would be best served by holding trial where the "witnesses 
and relevant circumstances surrounding the contested issues" could be found. 364 U.S. at 640; 
see also Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 803, 810 (1976) ("[T]he defendant ought to be 
able more easily to investigate the alleged crime, to obtain interviews with the witnesses to the 
alleged crime, to present the evidence found . . . and to insure the presence of witnesses at 
trial if it is held near the place of the commission of the alleged crime .... "). But see 8A 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 5, 1J 18.02, at 18-14 (''It is doubtful whether the 
concern which led to the inclusion of two provisions regarding venue could have been to facili-
tate the prosecution of crime, by fixing trial in a place convenient for the government's wit-
nesses."). See generally 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 301, at 191-94. 
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ally resort to formalistic statutory analysis, 10 considering constitu-
tional policy only in those rare instances when they cannot glean any 
indication of congressional intent as to venue. 11 This formalistic ap-
proach has yielded inconsistent results. In some cases it has re-
stricted venue so severely that defendants who were tried in their 
home districts, which had substantial contacts with the alleged of-
fenses, succeeded in reversing their convictions for improper 
venue; 12 in other cases, statutory analysis has resulted in broad 
IO. "The [venue test used by most courts] ... is basically a formalistic approach which 
focuses on the elements constituting the offense, the acts done, how they relate to the offense 
and where they had impact." Abrams,supra note 5, at 817;seealso Comment,supra note 4, at 
402 ("The courts have generally glossed over the serious constitutional venue problems . . . 
concentrating upon the explicit language of applicable constitutional provisions without due 
regard to the underlying spirit."). 
The underlying assumption of the formalistic approach is that Congress, as the sole pro• 
mulgator of federal crimes, has plenary power to define where those crimes are "committed," 
subject only to the requirement that the offense in question have some minimal contacts with 
the district in which venue is laid. See 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 302, at 201 ("Congress 
lacks power to provide for trial in a district other than that in which the offense was commit-
ted, but this is not a significant limitation on congressional power. By altering the verb in a 
statute it may alter the nature of the offense, and thus the proper venue, or it may proscribe 
some additional offense related to the principal offense."); Abrams, supra note 5, at 816 ("It 
appears that Congress, by its definition of the elements of offenses, by its formulation of the 
general venue provision, and by enactment of specific venue provisions attached to particular 
offenses exercises an almost plenary power over venue."). Congress may explicitly provide for 
venue in any district "through which a process of wrongdoing moves." United States v. John-
son, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944). Thus Congress can provide that venue for accepting price dis-
criminations in respect of the transportation of goods in interstate commerce may lie in any 
district through which the goods are transported, see Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 
209 U.S. 56, 74 (1908), and that venue for using the mails to ship dentures prepared by an 
unlicensed dentist may lie in any district through which the dentures are shipped, Johnson, 323 
U.S. at 274. 
The formalistic approach encounters more difficulty when Congress makes no explicit ref-
erence to venue. In those circumstances, "the locus delicti must be determined from the nature 
of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it." United States v. Ander-
son, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946). This determination apparently incorporates any method of 
statutory construction a court wishes to apply: "The decisions are discrete, each looking to the 
nature of the crime charged." Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631,635 (1961). See generally 2 
C. WRIGHT,supra note 3, § 302; Orfield, Venue of Federal Criminal Cases, 17 U. PITT. L. REV. 
375 (1956). 
11. See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944) ("If an enactment of Congress 
equally permits the underlying spirit of the constitutional concern for trial in the vicinage to be 
respected rather than to be disrespected, construction should go in the direction of constitu-
tional policy even though not commanded by it."); United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 
(1958). 
12. In United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 (1916), a prosecution for failing to file a 
required statement regarding an alien harbored for prostitution was brought in the defendant's 
home district in the State of Washington. The Court found it necessary to consider the etymol-
ogy of the word "file": " 'The word 'file' is derived from the Latin word Jilum ,' and relates to 
the ancient practice of placing papers on a thread or wire for safe keeping and ready reference. 
Filing, it must be observed, is not complete until the document is delivered and received." 241 
U.S. at 76 (quoting the lower court opinion in Lombardo, 228 F. 980, 983 (W.D. Wash. 1915)). 
Applying the rule that a culpable omission is "committed" where the duty should have been 
performed, see 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 302, at 198, the Court held that venue lay only in 
the District of Columbia and not where the required statement should have been prepared and 
mailed. 
The Lombardo decision can be compared with Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961), 
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venue possibilities that virtually negate the constitutional venue 
limitations. 13 
Courts have struggled to determine venue for cases involving ob-
struction of justice14 with similarly inconsistent results. 15 The circuits 
where the charge was making a false statement in a matter before a federal agency. The state-
ment, which falsely indicated that the defendant was not a member of the Co=unist party, 
had been filed with the National Labor Relations Board in Washington, D.C. Trial was held 
in Denver, where the defendant resided and from which the statement was mailed. The state-
ment was supplied pursuant to a now-repealed section of the Taft-Hartley Act, but that section 
did not require such a filing, except as a "condition precedent to a union's use of the Board's 
procedures." 364 U.S. at 635. "If it had, the whole process of filing, including the use of the 
mails, might logically be construed to constitute the offense." 364 U.S. at 635. Absent such a 
requirement, the Court, citing Lombardo, held that venue could be laid only in the District of 
Columbia: "The locus of the offense has been carefully specified; and only the single act of 
having a false statement at a specified place is penalized." 364 U.S. at 637 (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
In both Lombardo and Travis the government tried to invoke the continuing offense stat-
ute. Lombardo, 241 U.S. at 77; Travis, 364 U.S. at 633-34;see note l supra. In each case the 
government failed, and the formalistic approach worked to reverse the conviction of a defen-
dant whose "chief complaint was conviction, not conviction in a forum favorable to the gov-
ernment." Barber, Venue in Federal Criminal Cases: A Plea for Return to Principle, 42 TEXAS 
L. REV. 39, 47 (1963). 
13. See, e.g., Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908). The defendant 
company was charged with receiving price discriminations in respect of the transportation of 
goods in interstate co=erce, in violation of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903) (now 
codified in substantially modified form at 49 U.S.C. § 11903 (Supp. III 1979)). The shipment 
in question was carried by rail from Kansas to New York; venue was laid in the Western 
District of Missouri, which was along the route. The Court co=ented approvingly: 
"[T]ransportation being of the essence of the offense, when it takes place, whether in one dis-
trict or another, whether at the beginning, at the end, or in the middle of the journey, it is 
equally and at all times co=itted." 209 U.S. at 74. The Court could have made an equally 
plausible argument, however, that the "essence" of the offense was the acceptance of the ad-
vantageous price, and that transportation was merely the element that conferred jurisdiction 
on the federal courts. 
14. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (West Supp. 1983) provides: 
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or co=unication, 
endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of 
any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other 
proceeding before any United States co=issioner or other co=itting magistrate, in the 
discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on 
account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or 
having been such juror, or injures any such officer, co=issioner, or other committing 
magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his official duties, 
or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or co=unication, influ-
ences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due ad-
ministration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 
five years, or both. 
Until recently, § 1503 covered interference with witnesses, as well as jurors and court of-
ficers. See S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1982),reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& AD. NEWS 2515, 2520. Most of the obstruction of justice cases discussed in this Note, see 
note 15 i'!fra, involved interference with witnesses and arose under this earlier version of 
§ 1503. Today such cases would be brought under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512 (West Supp. 1983), 
which provides, in relevant part: 
(a) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, or thre~tens another per-
son, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, 
with intent to---
(1) influence the testimony of any person in an official proceeding; 
(2) cause or induce any person to-
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have divided over where to lay venue in prosecutions for obstruction 
of justice when the defendant allegedly acted in one judicial district 
to obstruct a proceeding that was pending in another. 16 This Note 
argues that formalistic analysis, which has led courts to set venue in 
the district of the affected trial, should be rejected in favor of a more 
policy-oriented approach. Part I demonstrates that a formalistic 
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from 
an official proceeding; 
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the ob-
ject's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; 
(C) evade legal process su=oning that person to appear as a witness, or to 
produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or 
(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been sum-
moned by legal process; or 
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the co=unication to a law enforcement officer or 
judge of the United States of information relating to the co=ission or possi-
ble commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, 
parole, or release pending judicial proceedings; 
shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 
(b) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, delays, pre-
vents, or dissuades any person from-
(1) attending or testifying in an official proceeding; 
(2) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States the com-
mission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of condi-
tions of probation, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings; 
(3) arresting or seeking the arrest of another person in connection with a Federal 
offense; or 
(4) causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation revocation proceed-
ing, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in such prosecution or proceeding; 
or attempts to do so, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than 
one year, or both. 
(d) For the proposes of this section-
(!) an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time 
of the offense; and 
(2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object need not be admissible 
in evidence or free of a claim of privilege. 
Although this statute effects significant changes in the law, see generally S. REP, No. 5323, 97th 
Cong., 2d. Sess. (1982), it does not purport to settle the venue problem that has arisen under 
the older obstruction statute and is likely to arise under this one. 
A number of other statutes can be brought under the "obstruction of justice" rubric. See 
18 U.S.C. § 1501 (1976) (assault on process server); § 1502 (resistance to extradition agent); 
§ 1504 (influencing juror by writing); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1505 (West Supp. 1983) (obstruction of 
proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees); 18 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976) (theft or 
alteration of record or process, false bail); § 1507 (picketing or parading); § 1508 (recording, 
listening to, or observing proceedings of grand or petit juries while deliberating or voting); 
§ 1509 (obstruction of court orders); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1510 (West Supp. 1983) (obstruction of 
criminal investigations). However,§§ 1503 and 1512 are the basic statutes protecting the fed-
eral judicial system from interference. 
15. See United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982); 
United States v. Barham, 666 F.2d 521 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 947 (1982); United 
States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); United States 
v. Nadolny, 601 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1979) (decided under 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (1976)); United 
States v. O'Donnell, 510 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States 
v. Swann, 441 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Brothman, 191 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 
1951); United States v. Bachert, 449 F. Supp. 508 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Elliott, 446 
F. Supp. 209 (W.D. Va. 1978). 
16. See notes 18-20 infra and accompanying text. 
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statutory analysis that closely inspects either legislative history or the 
language of the statute ultimately fails to reveal congressional gui-
dance. Accordingly, Part II examines the concerns underlying con-
stitutional venue limitations. The Note explores ihe history of the 
district-of-the-crime test and concludes that the test was intended as 
a :flexible rule to improve factfinding in criminal cases. Thus, the 
overriding consideration in venue problems should be the accessibil-
ity of witnesses and tangible evidence for investigation and use at 
trial. Applying this principle to obstruction of justice cases, this 
Note concludes that because witnesses and evidence will ordinarily 
be most available where the obstructive acts were committed, venue 
should lie in the district where. the defendant allegedly acted. 
I. STATUTORY ANALYSIS: AN ILLUSORY SEARCH FOR GUIDANCE 
Although obstruction of justice is a very old federal crime,17 it 
poses a venue problem that is not yet resolved. When a person acts 
in one judicial district to obstruct a judicial proceeding pending in 
another, where is the crime committed for venue purposes? Three 
circuits have held that the district in .which the defendant allegedly 
acted is the exclusive venue in such circumstances, 18 but four others 
have found venue properly laid in the district of the target proceed-
ing.19 Although the latter courts have reserved the question of 
whether venue might also lie where the defendant allegedly acted,20 
at least one district court has held that the district of the target pro-
ceeding is the only permissible place for trial.21 
In examining venue questions, courts and commentators have 
developed a few basic rules. Congress may provide that venue for 
the crimes it creates will lie in any district having some minimal con-
tacts with the offense.22 When Congress does not explicitly provide 
17. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 2, 4 Stat. 487,488 (1846), made it a crime to "corruptly, or 
by threats of force, endeavour to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer, 
in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty." The modem obstruction of 
justice statute is codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (West Supp. 1983). See note 14 supra. 
18. United States v. Nadolny, 601 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1979) (decided under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1510 (1976)); United States v. Swann, 441 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Broth-
man, 191 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1951); see also United States v. Bachert, 449 F. Supp. 508 (E.D. Pa. 
1978). 
19. United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1982); 
United States v. Barham, 666 F.2d 521 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 947 (1982); United 
States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); United States 
v. O'Donnell, 510 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). 
20. See Kibler, 667 F.2d at 455 n.2; Barham, 666 F.2d at 524 n.2; Tedesco, 635 F.2d at 906 
n.5; O'Donnell, 510 F.2d at 1193. 
21. See United States v. Elliott, 446 F. Supp. 209, 210 (W.D. Va. 1978). The circuit split 
on this question raises the possibility of "potential administrative problems, if not anomalous 
results." United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 456 (4th Cir.) (Winter, C.J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982). 
22. See Abrams,supra note 5, at 816 ("Congress could not ... consistently with the Con-
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for venue, "the locus delicti must be determined from the nature of 
the crime alleged and the location of the ... acts constituting it."23 
In an obstruction of justice case, both the district where the de-
fendant acts and the district of the target proceeding meet the mini-
mal contacts test.24 Congress could provide for venue in either, or 
both, under current venue doctrine.25 Congress has not, however, 
made any explicit provision for venue in obstruction of justice 
cases.26 Thus, under the formalistic venue approach, courts have 
brought the tools of statutory construction to bear on the problem, 
searching for some intimation of congressional intent. This Part 
considers contemporary arguments based on the legislative history 
and language of the obstruction of justice statute and finds them un-
convincing, concluding that in all probability Congress simply never 
considered the venue question. 
A. Legislative History: Obstruction of Justice as a "Constructive" 
Contempt of Court 
Historically, obstruction of justice and contempt of court27 are 
stitution, require an accused to be tried in a district having no contacts with the offense 
charged. But . . . the acts upon which venue is based may be extremely minimal in relation to 
the offense."). 
23. United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946) (citations omitted); quoted in 
Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 635 (1961); United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 454 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982); United States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); United States v. O'Donnell, 510 F.2d 1190, 1192-93 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). 
24. The location of the acts constituting a crime is, of course, a permissible venue. See 
note 23 supra and accompanying text. The place where criminal acts take effect has also been 
found to have sufficient contacts to support venue. See, e.g., Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 
60, 66 (1916) (prosecution for impersonating a member of Congress over the telephone may be 
brought where the call was received because "the personation took effect there"); United States 
v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 331-33 (4th Cir. 1982) (prosecution under Taft-Hartley Act for ac-
cepting an illegal payment from an employer may be brought where commerce is affected by 
the illegal act); cf. United States v. Swann, 441 F.2d 1053, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Tamm, J., 
concurring) (venue does not lie in district of target proceeding when a mere attempt to obstruct 
administration of justice is alleged, but question of venue left open if actual obstruction is 
alleged). 
25. "In some instances Congress has chosen to limit an otherwise permissible choice of 
venue." 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 302, at 201; see note 10 supra. 
26. See note 14 supra. Nor is this situation governed by the general continuing offense 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3237{a) (1976). To be a continuing offense, a crime must involve either two 
or more distinct acts or a continuously moving act. See United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 
73, 77 (1916), quoted in Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631,636 (1961); Abrams, supra note 
5, at 777-78, 789-91. Obstruction of justice is not begun where the act of obstruction is com-
mitted and completed where the target proceeding is pending; rather, it is "begun, carried out 
and completed" in one place, and therefore is not covered under the continuing offense statute. 
United States v. Swann, 441 F.2d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
27. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) provides: 
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its 
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the 
administration of justice; 
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closely related crimes.28 Until the early nineteenth century, conduct 
now cognizable under the obstruction of justice statute was punish-
able as contempt of court. 29 The limits of the contempt power were 
first defined by statute in the same 1831 congressional act that made 
obstruction of justice a separate criminal offense.30 Even today, all 
conduct encompassed under the obstruction of justice statute may 
still be punished as contempt of court when it occurs in or near the 
presence of the court.31 
Some courts have used this historical and logical link to justify 
laying venue for obstruction of justice in the district of the target 
proceeding. They argue that Congress viewed obstruction of justice 
as a "constructive" contempt of court - "in reality a codification of 
the court's power to punish contempts committed outside its pres-
ence, albeit by criminal prosecution following indictment."32 These 
courts conclude that because the offended tribunal has the exclusive 
power to punish actual contempts of its authority,33 it is also the 
proper venue for "constructive" contempt prosecutions.34 
This argument pushes the "constructive" contempt metaphor too 
far.35 This Section examines the legislative history and concludes 
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; 
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or 
co=and. 
28. Although the question has yet to arise, insofar as §1512 covers conduct obstructing 
judicial proceedings, the obstruction/contempt analogy is applicable to this section as well as 
§ 1503. However, it is not necessary under§ 1512 that an official proceeding "be pending or 
about to be instituted." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(d)(I) (West Supp. 1983). Since only courts, and 
not mere investigators, have contempt powers, the analogies break down in prosecutions for 
obstructive acts co=itted before the institution of judicial proceedings. 
29. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821) (Corrupt overtures to court 
and its officers punishable as contempt); NEW YORK COMMISSIONERS ON REVISION OF THE 
STATUTES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS 12, 72 (1828); Nelles & King, Contempt by Publi-
cation in the United States, 28 CoLUM. L. REV. 525, 531 (1928). 
30. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487 (1846). 
31. See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 49 (1941) ("an act of misbehavior though cov-
ered by [the obstruction of justice] provisions may also be a contempt if co=itted in the 
'presence' of the Court"). 
32. United States v. O'Donnell, 510 F.2d 1190, ll95 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 
(1975). See also United States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 
U.S. 962 (1981); United States v. Elliott, 446 F. Supp. 209, 210 (W.D. Va. 1978). 
33. See Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1904) ("[Orders imposing pun-
ishment] are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempts are charged. No 
jury passes upon the facts; no other court inquires into the charge."); Sullivan v. United States, 
4 F.2d 100, IOI (8th Cir. 1925); Dunham v. United States, 289 F. 376, 378-79 (5th Cir. 1923); 
Merchants' Stock & Grain Co. v. Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 201 F. 20, 27 (8th Cir. 
1912). 
34. This argument logically demands exclusive venue for obstruction of justice in the dis-
trict of the target proceeding. See United States v. Elliott, 446 F. Supp. 209, 210 (W.D. Va. 
1978) (denying motion to transfer to district where defendant acted) ("To hold otherwise 
would deprive this court of its traditional power to deal with contempts of its authority."). 
Other courts, however, have not stated whether the district of the target proceeding is the only 
proper venue. See note 20 supra. 
35. Although there may be some analytical value in calling an obstruction of justice a 
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that Congress intentionally distinguished obstruction of justice from 
contempt, with its summary proceedings. Unlike contempt, obstruc-
tive conduct committed outside the presence of the court does not 
give rise to the urgency that justifies suspension of procedural safe-
guards. Furthermore, this Section will argue, nothing in history or 
principle requires that the venue safeguard be treated differently 
from other procedural rights that are denied to those charged with 
contempt, but secured to obstruction of justice defendants.36 
Legislative history shows Congress' desire to place limits on the 
contempt power. Although the contempt power of the federal courts 
was first established by the Judiciary Act of 1789,37 the Act did not 
define contempt. The movement for a statutory limitation of the 
contempt power arose out of the controversy surrounding Judge 
James H. Peck. In 1830, Peck was impeached by the House of Rep-
resentatives and tried by the Senate for abusing the contempt 
power.38 The extensive arguments in the Peck trial repeatedly em-
phasized that the contempt power should be limited to that necessary 
for the preservation of judicial functions. 39 Contempt was seen as 
"constructive" contempt, the value of such metaphors derives from the dissimilarity, as much 
as the similarity, of the objects compared. See M. POLANY & H. PORSCH, MEANING 75 (1975), 
On the use of legal fictions, consider Mr. Justice Holmes' response to the holding that all 
members of a conspiracy may be tried where any one member co=itted an overt act: "[l)t is 
said that we should feign that they were here in order to warrant their being taken across the 
continent and tried in this place. The Constitution is not to be satisfied with a fiction." Hyde 
v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 390 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
36. In addition to indictment by grand jury, the obstruction defendant is entitled to trial by 
jury. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 49 (1941); cf. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) 
(only petty contempts may be tried without honoring demand for trial by jury). Where con-
tempt occurs in the actual presence of the court, it may be punished without notice and hear-
ing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42{a). A contempt conviction for conduct that is also criminal carries 
no double jeopardy protection. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564,594 (1895); 3 C. WRIGHT, supra 
note 3, § 706. 
37. Ch. 20, § 17, l Stat. 73, 83 (1789). Moreover, such power is arguably inherent in the 
courts and exists independently of any statute. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat,) 204, 
227-28 (1821). 
38. Peck, a District Court judge in Missouri, held Luke Edward Lawless in contempt for 
publishing a letter critical of one of the judge's opinions, claiming that the letter tended to 
"bring odium on the court, and to impair the confidence of the public in the purity of its 
decisions." A. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK 2 (Boston 1833 & re-
print 1972). "The proceeding was a travesty on justice, as the case was conspicuous for the 
bias, rudeness and anger shown by the judge." C. THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF 
COURT 26 (1934). In 1830, the House of Representatives voted to impeach Peck. After a six-
week trial, which included nine days of argument on the law of contempt, the Senate acquitted 
Peck by a 21-21 vote. The result has variously been explained "by sympathy for the age and 
infirmities of the judge, by party and intraparty considerations, and by the hostility between 
President Jackson and House Manager Buchanan." C. THOMAS, supra at 27 (footnotes omit-
ted). On the day after the acquittal, February I, 1831, the House passed a resolution directing 
the Committee on the Judiciary "to inquire into the expediency of defining by statute all of-
fences which may be punished as contempts of the courts of the United States." 7 CONG. DEB, 
560-6 I (1831). 
39. See, e.g., A. STANSBURY, supra note 38, at 87 (argument of Rep. M'Duffie): 
Necessity ... must also be the plea of the federal judges, by which only they can justify 
the exercise of the power of punishing for contempts . . . . It must be a case of actual 
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essentially an emergency power, necessary only "to punish all direct 
outrages upon the court; to prevent the Judge from being driven 
from the bench, and the jury from being driven from their box."40 
Of paramount concern to Congress was the violation of procedural 
safeguards,41 including the venue protections,42 that use of the con-
tempt power entails. 
A few weeks after the Peck trial ended, Congress, without further 
recorded debate, passed a law clarifying the law of contempt.43 The 
new Act limited summary punishments to misbehavior in the pres-
ence of the court "or so near thereto44 as to obstruct the administra-
tion of justice," misbehavior of officers of the court, and 
disobedience of court orders. Section 2 of the Act provided for pros-
ecution by indictment of persons who "corruptly, or by threats or 
force, endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, wit-
ness, or officer, in any Court of the United States."45 This distinction 
suggests that Congress had determined that the obstuctive conduct 
defined in section 2 did not create an emergency sufficient to justify 
use of summary contempt power. Far from codifying the power of 
the court to punish all contempts of its authority wherever they oc-
cur, the Act substantially restricted contempt powers that the courts 
had previously exercised.46 
necessity, obvious to the co=on sense of every impartial person. The administration of 
justice must be actually obstructed. 
A. STANSBURY, supra note 38, at 438-39 (argument of Rep. James Buchanan, who managed 
the Peck impeachment and chaired the committee that drafted§ 1 of the 1831 Act): 
Whatever inherent powers the courts of the United States possess, they must derive 
from the great law of necessity .... 
[T]he courts of the United States, by the very act of their creation, were invested with 
such implied powers as were necessary for self-preservation, and for conducting the busi-
ness with which they were entrusted. The implication of power cannot and ought not to 
transcend this necessity. 
See generally J. THOMAS, THE LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT 67-72 (1904). 
40. A. STANSBURY, supra note 38, at 87 (argument of Rep. M'Duffie). 
41. A. STANSBURY, supra note 38, at 445-46 (argument of Rep. Buchanan) (noting that 
Peck's contempt proceedings against Lawless denied him trial by jury, an impartial judge, 
indictment by a grand jury, and protection against self-incrimination and double jeopardy). 
42. See A. STANSBURY, supra note 38, at 89 (argument of Rep. M'Duffie) (Contempt per-
mits punishment "in utter disregard of all the constitutional guarantees, which secure to every 
citizen the right 'to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and District 
wherein the crime shall have been committed.'") (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). 
43. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487. 
44. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487, 488. The extension of the contempt power to 
misbehavior "so near thereto" denotes the geographic vicinity of the court, not an immediate 
causal link. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48-49 (1941). 
45. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487, 488. 
46. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945). The presence of§ 2 in the 1831 Act does 
not reflect a congressional purpose to give courts the power to punish all contempts of their 
authority, regardless of where they take place. Prior to 1831 the acts proscribed by§ 2 were 
punishable by su=ary contempt procedures. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. 
When misconduct outside the presence of the court was excluded from § I of the Act, § 2 
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Section 2 afforded the procedural safeguards of indictment and 
trial by jury to defendants charged with obstructing justice. Venue 
was not specifically mentioned, and one could argue that Congress 
intended to treat venue for obstruction of justice like venue for con-
tempt, making the offended tribunal the proper place for subsequent 
prosecution.47 The Peck debates, however, show a specific concern 
for venue limitations along with the other procedural safeguards.48 
There is no reason to assume that Congress intended obstruction of 
justice to be subject to all normal procedural safeguards except 
venue limitations. Moreover, in the Peck trial, Congress identified 
necessity as the only basis for abridging such procedual protection.49 
There is no necessity that the required indictment and prosecution be 
brought in the district of the target proceeding; the offended court's 
integrity could be vindicated by charges brought by any U.S. Attor-
ney in any district court. so 
Contempt of court and obstruction of justice punish many of the 
same forms of conduct, and many substantive concepts relating to 
one can be applied to the other.51 But, as the history set forth here 
was added by the Senate as an eleventh-hour amendment to insure that such misbehavior 
would not go unpunished. Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication, 28 CoLUM. L. REV, 525, 
530-31 & n.24 (1928). "It was clearly undesirable that such misdeeds be left altogether im-
mune from punishment in the Federal Courts. There was no necessity, or even strong expedi-
ency, that they be dealt with su=arily." Id at 531. Section 2 was, it seems, a stopgap 
measure. Its presence in the Act cannot be construed as evidence of any overall congressional 
design regarding contempts. Indeed, when systematic codification of the federal statutes was 
undertaken,§ I of the 1831 Act was incorporated into the Judicial Code, ch. 231, § 268, 36 
Stat. 1087, 1163 (1911), while § 2, as amended, was moved to the Criminal Code, ch. 321, 
§ 135, 35 Stat. 1088, 1113 (1909). Congress evidently intended that contempts committed 
outside the presence of the court should be prosecuted only under the safeguards of criminal 
procedure. 
Nevertheless, in United States v. O'Donnell, 510 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 
1001" (1975), the Court of Appeals concluded that obstruction of justice should be treated as a 
constructive contempt for venue purposes. In reaching this decision, the court relied on Nye v, 
United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941). In Nye, according to the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court 
"strongly implied, if it did not hold, that such contempts are punishable by the court whose 
authority is challenged regardless of where the contemptuous acts may have occurred." 5 IO 
F.2d at 1195. This reading ignores the Supreme Court's explicit holding. The Court reversed 
the contempt convictions of two men charged with inducing "through the use of liquor and 
persuasion," a feeble-minded plaintiff to drop a civil suit. 313 U.S. at 39. Noting that the 
alleged acts occurred over 100 miles from the court where the civil action was pending, the 
Court ruled they were not "so m:ar thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice" and 
could not be punished as contempt. 313 U.S. at 48-52. The Court went on to say: "If petition-
ers can be punished for their misconduct, it must be under the Criminal Code where they will 
be '!/forded the normal safeguards surrounding criminal prosecutions," 313 U.S. at 53 (emphasis 
added). 
47. See note 32supra. 
48. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. 
49. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text. 
50. See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273,278 (1944) ("Prosecutions of federal crimes 
are under the general supervision of the Attorney General of the United States; United States 
Attorneys do not exercise autonomous authority."). 
51. See Annot., 20 A.L.R. Fed. 731, 735 (1974). 
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shows, a perceived need for different procedural rules motivated 
Congress to distinguish between the two offenses. The substantive 
parallels between obstruction of justice and contempt of court do not 
provide a basis for blurring this congressionally imposed procedural 
distinction. 52 
B. Statutory Language: The "Focus" of Section 1503 
The language of the modem obstruction of justice statute, section 
1503 of title 1853, has been the basis for two distinct, but related, 
arguments in favor of laying venue in the district of the target pro-
ceeding. Both arguments contend that the focus of section 1503 is 
not the act of obstruction, but rather its intended effect on the ad-
ministration of justice. Thus, the crime is "committed" where the 
off ender intends that justice be obstructed, the district of the target 
proceeding. 54 
The first argument, advanced by the Sixth Circuit in United 
States v. O' Donnell ,55 proceeds from the supposition that section 
1503 is very general as to the type of acts it condemns, although it is 
quite specific as to the nature of the intended effect upon the admin-
istration of justice.56 This observation suggests that the "focus" of 
the statute is not on the acts done, but instead "is upon the intended 
effect of any corrupt conduct of whatever description upon the ad-
ministration of justice by the courts;"57 thus, the crime is committed 
where its effect is to occur, the district in·which the target proceed-
ings are pending. 
It follows from this reasoning that obstruction of justice can be 
distinguished, for example, from the crime of bribing public offi-
cials, 58 where venue lies in the district where the bribe is passed, not 
52. See United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 456 (4th Cir.) (Winter, C.J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982): 
It seems to me that the purpose of§ 2 of the Act of March 2, 1831 . . . was to remove the 
courts' power to punish for constructive contempts and to require that such proceedings 
be conducted by the normal process of indictment, trial and conviction, including normal 
rules with respect to venue. Thus I cannot conclude that the offended court should be the 
preferred forum for prosecution of acts occurring elsewhere. 
53. See note 14 supra. 
54. The Supreme Court set the stage for this argument in Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 
631 (1961), where it held that venue for filing a false "non-communist" affidavit with the 
NLRB lies only in Washington, D.C. Because the statute did not require that a statement be 
filed, the Court could not construe the making and mailing of a false statement as part of the 
offense. 364 U.S. at 635. "[O]nly the single act of having a false statement at a specified place 
is penalized." 364 U.S. at 637. The Court apparently decided that the "focus" of the statute in 
question was the effect of "having" a false statement before the NLRB, not the act of making 
such a statement. 
55. 510 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). 
56. 510 F.2d at 1194; see also United States v. Barham, 666 F.2d 521, 523-24 (I Ith Cir.), 
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 947 (1982). 
51. O'Donnell, 510 F.2d at 1194. 
58. 18 U.S.C. § 20l(b) (1976) provides: 
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where the inducement is intended to have an effect on the official's 
public duties.59 Under the bribery statute, it is argued, the "essence" 
of the offense is "the actual giving or transfer of money or other 
thing of value," not the effect that the bribe may have.60 The appar-
ent distinction is that although the bribery statute condemns a care-
fully defined act with little regard to its intended effect, the 
obstruction statute defines an illegal purpose and proscribes any 
means of carrying it out. 
But this distinction between bribery and obstruction of justice is 
not convincing for three reasons. First, the obstruction statute spe-
cifically prohibits the use of "threats or force or. . . any threatening 
letter or communication" to interefere with pending judicial pro-
ceedings and therefore is not as general as to the type of acts it con-
demns as the O'Donnell argument claims.61 Second, the bribery 
statute, like section 1503, also "focuses" on the intended effect of the 
defendant's acts.62 Third, some conduct punishable by the bribery 
statute may also constitute an obstruction of justice.63 Adherence to 
O'Donnell's reasoning would cause venue in such cases to tum upon 
Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value to 
any public official or person who has been selected to be a public official, or offers or 
promises any public official or any person who has been selected to be a public official to 
give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent-
(!) to influence any official act; or 
(2) to influence such public official or person who has been selected to be a public 
official to commmit or aid in committing, or collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make 
opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or-
(3) to induce such public official or such person who has been selected to be a public 
official to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty. 
59. See In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1890); United States v. Ellenbogen, 365 F.2d 
982, 989 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 923 (1967); United States v. Michelson, 165 F.2d 
732, 734 (2d Cir.), ajfd, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); United States v. Garmatz, 445 F. Supp. 54, 59 (D. 
Md. 1977); cf. United States v. Swann, 441 F.2d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that 
venue both for bribery and obstruction of justice should lie where the defendant acts). 
60. O'Donnell, 510 F.2d at 1194. 
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976); see note 14 supra. The general term "corruptly" has added 
little else. See United States v. DeAlesandro, 361 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1966) (includes bribery); 
Untied States v. Polakoff, 121 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1941) (includes fraudulent inducements); 
United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587 (D. Conn. 1962) (includes perjury). 
In addition, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512 (West Supp. 1983), a well-drafted modern statute that 
supplements§ 1503,see note l4supra, is helpful in interpreting the archaic language of§ 1503. 
See United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940) (acts of Congress that deal with the same 
subject matter are in pari materia, and the "later act can therefore be regarded as a legislative 
interpretation of the earlier act . . . in the sense that it aids in ascertaining the meaning of the 
words as used in their contemporary setting.") (citations omitted). In§ 1512, Congress speci-
fied "intimidation, physical force, threats, misleading conduct, and harassment" as proscribed 
acts. The availability of this specific interpretative aid renders the type of acts condemned far 
less general than the O'Donnell court suggests. 
62. 18 U.S.C. § 20l(b) (1976), see note 58 supra, specifies three specific intents that may 
constitute the crime: intent to influence any official act, intent to influence a public official to 
participate in any fraud upon the United States, or intent to induce a public official to violate 
his lawful duties. Each of these intent elements "focuses" on the anticipated effect of the bribe. 
63. "The offenses and penalties prescribed in this section are separate from and in addition 
to those prescribed in sections 1503, 1504, and 1505 of this title." 18 U.S.C. § 20l(k) (1976). 
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the crime charged, and would complicate the venue problem when 
the government charges both bribery and obstruction of justice. 
If, in fact, section 1503 does emphasize the effect of the obstruc-
tive conduct instead of the act itself, it does not necessarily follow 
that venue must lie in the district of the intended effect. In the stat-
ute defining murder, for example, Congress plainly focused on the 
intended effect of the fatal act over the means used to carry out the 
offense.64 Congress nevertheless determined that venue should lie 
"where the injury was inflicted, or the poison administered or other 
means employed which caused the death, without regard to the place 
where the death occurs."65 It is not clear whether section 1503 does 
focus on intended effect over acts. Even if it does, Congress' han-
dling of the statute defining murder suggests that the venue implica-
tions of that focus are uncertain. 
The second argument based on the language of section 1503 was 
advanced by the First Circuit in United States v. Tedesco, 66 and uses 
the venerable technique of examining the "key verbs" of a criminal 
statute to determine its locus delecti.67 The final clause of section 
1503 applies to anyone who corruptly or by threats of force "influ-
ences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or 
impede, the due administration of justice."68 The court in Tedesco 
relied on these words in concluding that "Congress was concerned 
not with the place where the threats or offers of money or other ben-
efits were made, but with the effect such threats or bribes might have 
on a witness testifying in a particular proceeding."69 
The obstruction of justice statute as a whole, however, is so am-
64. "Murder is the the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought." 18 
u.s.c. § 1111 (1976). 
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3236 (1976). The O'JJonne/1 court attempted to distinguish both murder 
and bribery from obstruction of justice on the basis that they do not involve an intent to cause 
a certain result at a specified location. 510 F.2d at 1194. ("The intent to influence the conduct 
of a public official in no way depends upon where the public official may be at the time. . . . 
As far as murder is concerned, it is of no significance where the intended result is actually 
accomplished .... "). Under § 1503, the court said, ''the effect of corrupt conduct is always 
intended to occur only at one place; viz., the place or district in which the court sits or the 
proceeding is pending." 510 F.2d at 1194 (emphasis in original). This distinction is.not per-
suasive. Though a specific intent to obstruct a judicial proceeding is an element of the § 1503 
offense, see United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1971), there is no requirement 
that the defendant know where that target proceeding is pending. Surely a change in the venue 
of the target proceeding will not exculpate a defendant who intended to obstruct justice at the 
original location. 
66. 635 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981). 
67. 635 F.2d at 905; see also United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982). See generally Dobie, Venue in Criminal Cases in the United States 
District Court, 12 VA. L. REV. 287, 289 (1926). 
68. See note 14 supra. 
69. 6~5 F.2d at 905; see United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d at 454: 
We agree with Tedesco that analysis of the verbs defining the offense establishes that the 
situs of the crime is the place of the judicial proceeding that the accused sought to thwart. 
The threats, force, threatening letters, or co=unication mentioned in the statute are 
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biguous that it is highly unlikely that Congress was attempting to 
specify proper venue when it chose the words "influence, obstruct, or 
impede." Other clauses, applying to anyone who "endeavors to in-
fluence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror" or who "in-
jures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property,"70 
define the offense in terms of the offender's act and its immediate 
effect, not its effect on the target proceeding. Since some obstructive 
conduct can be described under any of these clauses,71 an analysis of 
the "key verbs" gives no helpful indication of congressional intent. 72 
Thus, despite the reasoning in O'Donnell and Tedesco, section 
1503 offers no indication of congressional intent as to venue. Be-
cause Congress frequently appends explicit venue provisions to 
criminal statutes,73 the lack of such a provision in section 1503 sug-
gests that Congress has simply never considered the venue prob-
lem. 74 Moreover, the nuances of section 1503 have been lost to age 
and archaic draftsmanship. Thus, the formalistic approach has 
failed to produce a convincing rationale for laying venue in either 
possible district. 
nouns which merely provide a description of the means employed by the accused to 
achieve an illegal end. 
10. See note 14 supra. 
The version of§ 1512 reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee contained a clause very 
similar to the final clause of§ 1503. See S. 2420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 20l(a) (1982) ("Who-
ever ... with intent corruptly, or by threats of force, or by any threatening letter or communi-
cation, influences, obstructs, impedes ... enforcement and prosecution of federal law •••• "), 
Significantly, this language was omitted from the final version. As a result, § 1512 contains 
only verbs which define the offense in terms of the prohibited act and its immediate impact on 
the witness, not on the administration of justice as such. 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Swann, 441 F.2d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1911);seealso Falk v. 
United States, 370 F.2d 472,476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 926 (1966); Berra v. United 
States, 221 F.2d 590, 596-97 (8th Cir. 1955), ajfd., 351 U.S. 131 (1956). 
12. Tedesco and Kibler failed to heed the warning given long ago by Professor Dobie, a 
proponent of the "key verb" technique: 
When, as is so often the case, the statute enumerates several such verbs, only scrupulous, 
even meticulous, nicety in exact quotation can prevent these statutes, as well as the deci-
sions under them, from proving a snare and a delusion to the unwary. 
Dobie, supra note 67, at 289. 
73. When the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted, the Advisory Commit-
tee listed more than 30 special statutory venue provisions. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18 advisory com-
mittee note, reprinted in 3A C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 502-03 app .. Many of these provisions 
are still in effect. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (regulation of securities exchanges); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 659 (larceny of interstate or foreign shipments); 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (white slave traffic); 28 
U.S.C. § 3235 (capital cases); 28 U.S.C. § 3238 (offenses on the high seas). 
74. [T]he difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the Legislature had no mean-
ing at all; when the question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; when what 
the judges have to do is, not to determine what the Legislature did mean on a point which 
was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not present to 
its mind, if the point had been present. 
J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 165 (1909). Though the question has yet to 
arise, it appears that § 1512 will require judges to make similar interpolations. 
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II: CONSTITUTIONAL VENUE POLICY 
Since the obstruction of justice statute does not indicate either 
implicitly or explicity where venue should lie, the choice of venue 
should be governed by policy considerations derived from the venue 
limits set forth in the Constitution. The Supreme Court has noted 
the importance of respecting, wherever possible, "the underlying 
spirit of the constitutional concern for trial in the vicinage."75 Unfor-
tunately, the Court has not voiced a consistent understanding of that 
policy.76 This Part first examines the historical evidence, concluding 
that the Framers limited venue to the district of the crime in order to 
promote thorough factfinding and that constitutional venue limita-
tions should be applied flexibly toward that end. The Note then 
demonstrates that these policy goals are relevant in contemporary 
obstruction of justice cases, and concludes that the constitutional ap-
proach mandates setting venue in the district where the acts were 
committed. 
A. Historical Background of Constitutional Venue Policy77 
The constitutional venue provisions did not depart significantly 
from the common law, which laid venue for criminal prosecutions in 
the county where the crime was committed.78 Although this rule 
originated when jurors decided cases on the basis of their personal 
75. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944); see also United States v. Cores, 356 
U.S. 405, 407 (1958). 
16. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. 
77. The actual events that precipitated the inclusion of venue limitations in the 
Constitution are detailed elsewhere. See Blume, supra note 3, at 59-67; Kershen, supra note 9, 
at 805-08; Comment, supra note 4, at 404-14. The impetus seems to have come from 
Parliament's 1769 revival of a statute of Henry VIII providing for trial in England of treasons 
committed "out of this realm of England." An Act for the Trial of Treasons Committed Out 
of the King's Dominions, 1543, 35 Hen. 8, ch.2. The Declaration of Independence decried the 
King for "transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses." The Declaration of 
Independence para. 21 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in l DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 101 (H. 
Commager 5th ed. 1949). 
78. See l J. BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 49 (2d ed. 1913); Blume, supra note 3, 
at 60-61. This approach continues to be the general rule in state criminal prosecutions. See Y. 
KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1068 (5th ed. 1980). 
Like the present venue test, the common law rule was subjected to excessively literal appli-
cation by the courts. The doctrine emerged that a crime could be prosecuted only in a venue 
in which all the facts necessary to establish the offense occurred. See l T. STARKIE, A TREA-
TISE ON CRIMINAL PLEADING l (2d ed. 1822). The impracticality of this rule, which meant that 
some crimes were not subject to prosecution anywhere, id. at 2, was gradually ameliorated by 
special venue provisions in various criminal statutes. See ARCHBOLD's SUMMARY OF THE LAW 
RELATIVE To PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 17-25 (4th Am. ed. 1840) [here-
inafter cited as ARCHBOLD]. In homicide cases in which the mortal injury and death occurred 
in different counties, a special statute laid venue where death occurred. An Act for Trial of 
Murder and Felonies Committed in Several Counties, 1548, 2 & 3 Edw. 6, ch. 24, § 2. A 
continuing offense statute provided that crimes begun in one county and completed in another 
could "be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined and punished in any of the said Counties." 
An Act for Improving the Administration of Criminal Justice in England, 1826, 7 Geo. 4, ch. 
64, § 12. Stephen said of these statutes: "The only general interest attaching to these excep-
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knowledge of the participants and events,79 the reasons that account 
for the rule's continued vitality emerged in the late eighteenth cen-
tury. At that point, the authorities began to defend local venue as a 
means of providing fairer trials and more accurate results: 
A man charged with a crime, is, by the laws of England, usually tried 
in the county in which he is said to have committed the offence, that the 
circumstances of his crime may be more clearly examined, and that the 
knowledge which the jurors thereby receive of his general character, and 
of the credibility of the witnesses, might assist them in pronouncing, 
with a greater degree of certainty, upon his innocence or guilt. 80 
Proponents of the common law rule were particularly conscious of 
the hardships the accused might face in marshalling his witnesses at 
a remote forum. 81 Better factfinding justified the selection of venue; 
trial near the scene of the crime made it easier to investigate the facts 
and present evidence at trial. 
An emphasis on factfinding was also the hallmark of the early 
state constitutional venue provisions.82 At the time of the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787, four of the thirteen state constitutions 
contained venue provisions. 83 Three of these were expressly in-
tended to protect the right to trial of the facts where they "hap-
pened." The New Hampshire Constitution, for example, provided: 
In criminal prosecutions, the trial of facts in the vicinity where they 
happen, is so essential to the security of the life, liberty and estate of 
the citizen, that no crime or offence ought to be tried in any other 
county than that in which it is committed. 84 
The Massachusetts85 and Maryland86 provisions express the same 
venue policy that facts should be tried where the relevant evidence 
tions is that they prove that the general principle which requires so many exceptions must be 
wrong." I J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 277 (1883). 
The rule requiring that prosecutions be brought only where all the facts establishing the 
offense occurred apparently had some currency in the courts of the United States, see, e.g., 
United States v. Plympton, 27 F. Cas. 578 (C.C.D.C. 1833) (No. 16,057), with a similar legisla-
tive response. Congress adopted the English continuing offense statute almost verbatim, Act of 
Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 484 (1868) (now codified in modified form at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3237(a) (1976)), but chose to lay venue in the two-district homicide situation where the mor-
tal injury was inflicted. 18 U.S.C. § 3236 (1976). 
19. See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT (1951); Blume, supra note 3, at 60-61; Ker-
shen, supra note 9, at 813. 
80. 16 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 490 (1769) (emphasis added). 
81. Id. 
82. Historians have noted the strong influence of the early state constitutions on the delib-
erations of the Philadelphia Convention. See, e.g., w. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONST!· 
TUTIONS 4 (1980). As the venue provision was not a subject of much controversy, direct 
evidence of the Convention's intent is lacking. See Kershen, supra note 9, at 808. 
83. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIX; Mo. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 
XVIII; MAss. CONST. of 1780, Part the First, art. XIII ; N.H. CONST. of 1783, art. I,§ 17. 
84. N.H. CONST. of 1783, art. I,§ 17. 
85. "In criminal prosecutions, the verification of facts in the vicinity where they happen, is 
one of the greatest securities of the life, liberty and property of the estate.'' MASS, CONST. of 
1780, Part the First, art. XIII. 
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would be readily accessible, that is, where the facts "happened."87 
The federal constitutional venue provisions were promulgated in 
this legal-historical context. Though these provisions were undoubt-
edly seen as having a number of virtues, 88 the preeminent concern, 
and the one most relevant today,89 was facilitating factfinding by 
86. "[T]he trial of facts where they arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liber-
ties and estate of the people." MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVIII. 
87. One commentator has suggested that these provisions were actually intended to insure 
that the facts would be determined by local jurors having knowledge relevant to· the crime. 
See Kershen,supra note 9, at 836 n.121. However, this rationale was not followed in one of 
the few early cases construing these provisions. In Commonwealth v. Parker, 19 Mass. (2 
Pick.) 549 (1824), the court held that it was permissible under the Massachusetts constitution to 
bring a murder prosecution in the county in which the victim died, rather than where the lethal 
blow was inflicted, because the death and 
the circumstances of it, the connexion between that and the supposed cause, the manner in 
which the party has languished, the supervenience of some disease disconnected from the 
antecedent injury, the dying declarations of the deceased, and many other circumstances, 
may be important facts in the trial, and it may happen, and often does, that the mere 
giving the stroke was the least difficult fact to be settled. 
19 Mass. at 558. The Parker court found that the testimony of the doctor who examined the 
victim and of those who heard his dying words were crucial to the case. The opinion empha-
sized the location of evidence, not the jurors' familiarity with the circumstances and dramatis 
personae of the crime, despite the defense argument to the contrary. 19 Mass. at 551. 
88. The adoption of the Sixth Amendment's district-of-the-crime test was prompted by the 
conviction that Article Ill did not provide a sufficiently narrow definition of the vicinage from 
which jurors were to be drawn. See F. HELLER, supra note 79, at 25-27; Kershen, supra note 
9, at 816-28. 
Although the Supreme Court has said that there is no constitutional right to trial in the 
defendant's home district, see, e.g., Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245 
(1964); In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257, 265 (1890), it has indicated that ''the underlying spirit of 
the constitutional concern for trial in the vicinage" demands that the district of the crime be 
construed to be, if possible, the defendant's home district. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 
273, 276 (1944); see also 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 301, at 193-94. This view places a 
premium on formalistic statutory construction despite its purported attention to the "underly-
ing spirit" of the venue provisions. Venue limitations apparently were viewed as a means of 
protecting defendants from the rigors and discomforts of trial far from their homes and fami-
lies. See 16 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 490 (1813); Blume, supra note 3, at 64-
66; Kershen, supra note 9, at 808-09. In the late 18th century, the defendant's place of resi-
dence and the place of the crime would ordinarily lie within the same venue. See SA MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 5, ~ 18.02, at 18-14; 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 301, at 191; 
Kershen, supra note 4, at 37. Yet the Constitution explicitly chose the situs of the crime as the 
place for trial when the two did not coincide. This choice suggests that the primary concern 
was the acccessibility of evidence, the only advantage that the place of commission holds over 
the accused's place of residence. See United States v. Aronoff, 463 F. Supp. 454, 457 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[T]he historical principles underlying venue policy are fairness and justice 
generally; the defendant's home district is relevant only as far as considerations of fairness and 
justice demand."); 2 C. WRIGHT,supra note 3, § 301, at 191; Kershen, supra note 9, at 810-11. 
89. See notes 105-11 i'!fra and accompanying text. At the present time, when complete 
ignorance of the circumstances surrounding a case is the goal of the jury selection process, trial 
by jury "of the vicinage" is a vestigial concept. See F. HELLER, supra note 79, at 95. 
Moreover, the desire to spare the accused the rigors of trial far from home is no longer a 
compellingjustifcation. First, improvements in transportation and communications have alle-
viated the rigors of travel and the isolation of remote courts typical of the 18th century. Sec-
ond, the district-of-the-crime test will not even serve this policy goal in many cases, since 
people today are far more likely to commit crimes outside their district of residence than they 
once were. 
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holding trial near where the relevant evidence could be found. 90 
Though the constitutional district-of-the-crime test is phrased as 
a positive command, the Framers must have been aware that 
problems would arise if it were applied too literally,91 even if they 
could not have imagined the extent to which those problems would 
grow.92 Historically, the venue limitations imposed by the com-
mon law and state constitutions were not literal and absolute. By the 
late eighteenth century, Parliament had begun to pass laws providing 
for broader venue possibilities than a literal approach to the county-
of-the-crime test would permit,93 treating the common law approach 
as a general rule of thumb that would usually, but not always, point 
to the "proper" venue.94 The state provisions are also notable for 
their fl~xibility. They cited the common law test in laudatory95 or 
admonitory96 terms, offering merely "a caution to all future legisla-
tors to regard this principle."97 This history suggests that, in venue 
questions, the constitutional test should not be employed rigidly, but 
rather in the manner necessary to facilitate factfinding. 
B. Application of Constitutional Venue Policy to Obstruction 
of Justice 
The history of constitutional venue limitations suggests that 
venue should be laid where evidence is most accessible. In obstruc-
tion of justice cases, courts must choose between the district where 
the obstructive acts took place and the district in which the target 
proceedings were being conducted. This Section argues that the con-
stitutional policy of enhancing factfinding can best be served by lay-
ing venue where the acts took place. 
90. See Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 640 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("basic 
policy" best served by trial where the "witnesses and relevant circumstances surrounding the 
contested issues" will be found); United States v. Nadolny, 601 F.2d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 1979) 
("Venue traditionally has been based on notions of fair, fast and efficient administration of 
trials. When venue is laid in the proper district ... witnesses are more readily available, and 
the operative facts and situs of the incident are closer at hand."). 
91. See note 78 supra; Kershen, supra note 4, at 37 n.307. 
92. See, e.g., cases cited in note 7 supra. 
93. For example, venue for extortion, resisting or assaulting excise officers, and inciting 
soldiers or sailors to mutiny could be laid in any county. ARCHBOLD, supra note 78, at 18-19, 
94. Cf. J. STEPHEN, supra note 78, at 278: 
[A]ll courts otherwise competent to try an offense should be competent to try it irrespec-
tively of the place where it was co=itted, the place of trial being determined by the 
convenience of the court, the witnesses, and the person accused. Of course, as a general 
rule, the county where the offense was committed would be the most convenient place for 
the purpose. 
95. The Massachusetts and Maryland provisions do not incorporate the common law test 
as such, but rather only praise in general terms trial "where" or "in the vicinity where" !he 
facts occurred. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text. 
96. The New Hampshire provision states that "no crime or offense ought to be tried" other 
than where it was co=itted. See note 84 supra and accompanying text. 
97. Co=onwealth v. Parker, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 549, 554 (1824). 
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Venue should lie exclusively in the district in which the defen-
dant acted, where the "witnesses and relevant circumstances sur-
rounding the contested issues"98 will probably be found. The 
indictments in obstruction of justice cases allege simple acts - a 
beating,99 a shooting, 100 a threat, 101 an offer of a bribe or other in-
ducement 102 - that took place at specified times and places; most 
available evidence will relate to these acts. The only fact that occurs 
in the district of the target proceeding is the fact of the affected pro-
ceeding itself, 103 which is unlikely to be a contested issue, and in any 
event can be proven by documentary evidence easily transmitted to 
the site of the obstruction trial. 
One could argue that improvements in transportation and com-
munication would insure the availability of evidence and witnesses 
even if venue were laid in the district of the target proceedings, and 
that the need for careful application of the historical concern under-
lying the constitutional safeguards has therefore been eliminated. 104 
In reality, however, geography is still a concern in investigating and 
trying obstruction of justice cases. First, although compulsory pro-
cess in federal criminal cases reaches the entire United States, 105 an 
indigent defendant can secure a subpoena for an absent witness only 
by showing that the witness is "necessary to an adequate defense," 106 
a revelation that may expose defense strategy. 107 Second, attorneys 
98. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 640 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also 
United States v. Nadolny, 601 F.2d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 1979). 
99. See United States v. Nadolny, 601 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1979) (FBI informant beaten by 
fellow Teamsters at place of work). 
100. See United States v. Barham, 666 F.2d 521 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 947 
(1982); United States v. Swann, 441 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1971); cf. United States v. O'Donnell, 
510 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975) (attempt to hire an assassin). 
IOI. See United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 453 (4th Cir.) (defendant-turned-witness 
told by co-defendant's friend: "you know what happens to snitches, snitches get hurt ... even 
in jail ... they get hurt, even there."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982); United States v. 
Bachert, 449 F. Supp. 508 (E.D. Pa. 1978). . 
102. See United States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d 902, 903-04 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 
U.S. 962 (1981) (witness in fraud and conspiracy case told that defendant "could do a lot" for 
him ifhe did not "add any more wood to the fire"); United States v. Bachert, 449 F. Supp. 508 
(E.D. Pa. 1978). 
103. The pendency of a target proceeding in the federal courts is a fact that the govern-
ment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Cotton v. United States, 409 F.2d 1049, 1054 
(10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1016 (1970). 
104. A similar argument was rejected with elaboration in United States v. Passodelis, 615 
F.2d 975, 977 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Though our nation has changed in ways which it is difficult to 
imagine that the Framers of the Constitution could have foreseen, the rights of criminal de-
fendants which they sought to protect in the venue provisions of the Constitution are neither 
outdated nor outmoded."). 
105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e)(l). 
106. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b). 
107. "The practical result [of FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b)] is that the indigent defendant gives 
considerable discovery to the government before trial .... " 2 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES§ 17.64 (1966). The rule does permit ex parte applica-
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commonly interview potential witnesses and gather evidence 
throughout a trial, and unexpected events may require calling a wit-
ness on short notice - things that cannot be done easily if the wit-
nesses and evidence are located far from the district of the target 
proceeding.108 Third, although some physical evidence can be easily 
and cheaply transferred to the place of trial, the scene of the obstruc-
tive acts cannot be. A view, cumbersome even when venue is laid 
near the scene of the acts, can be entirely impracticable if trial is held 
near the target proceedings.109 Even if a view by the jury is not con-
templated, the defense attorney may be deprived of a personal visit 
to the scene, which often provides invaluable information for im-
peaching witnesses. 110 Fixing venue in a district other than the one 
in which the contested acts occurred greatly hampers these ordinary 
practices. 111 
In some cases, application of the constitutional policy will be 
more difficult. An obstruction of justice could involve a series of acts 
in or communications among a number of different districts. In 
these cases the choice should be among districts in which acts consti-
tuting the offense took place. 112 Clearly, the district of the target 
proceeding should not be chosen. Even though it satisfies the mini-
mal standards of contact with the crime and is not expressly prohib-
ited by any statutory provision, laying venue in that district ignores 
tion for the subpoena, to maintain defense secrecy. C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at § 272, at 140-
42. However, the defendant may fail to request an ex parte hearing, see Thor v. United States, 
574 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1978), or the court may fail to safeguard the requested confidentiality. 
See United States v. Meriwether, 486 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 
(1974); United States v. Sanders, 322 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Pa. 1971), qffd, 459 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 860 (1972). 
108. See A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES-II 
§§ 113-114 (1971). 
109. See United States v. Nadolny, 601 F.2d 940, 943 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979) ("Carrying the 
Government's argument to its extreme, one could visualize a § 1510 criminal trial in West 
Virginia (situs of an investigation) when the beating of an informant in that investigation took 
place in Anchorage, Alaska."). 
llO. See A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 108, § ll l. 
11 l. Even if geographical hurdles can be overcome, the waste of defense, prosecution, and 
judicial resources is difficult to justify in a prosecutorial system with 94 "branch offices." See 
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1982/83, at 
325-26 (1982). 
Moreover, the continued importance of laying venue where trial is convenient is recognized 
in the 1966 amendment to Rule 2l(b) providing for transfer to any district "for the conven• 
ience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice," without regard for the district of 
the crime. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 21 advisory committee note; cf. Barber, supra note 12, at 50• 
51 (arguing for rule equivalent to that of 1966 amendment prior to its adoption). The advisory 
committee approved the criteria for transfer enumerated in Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. 
Co., 376 U.S. 240 (1964), which included "location of possible witnesses," "location of events 
likely to be in issue," "location of documents and records likely to be involved," and "expense 
to the parties." 376 U.S. at 244. Plait was decided under the original version of Rule 2l(b), 
which permitted transfer only among districts in which some part of the crime was 
"committed." 
ll2. In such cases, the continuing offense statute, see note I supra, would be applicable. 
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the principal concern underlying constitutional venue limitations -
that trial should be held near where the relevant evidence can be 
found. 
The analysis that this Note applies to obstruction of justice cases 
may be applied to other crimes for which venue has not been specifi-
cally determined by statute. Modem crimes and modem means of 
committing crimes have complicated the operation of the district-of-
the-crime test. 113 Literal use of the venue test, by painstakingly ex-
amining the words that define a crime to determine where it is "com-
mitted," has led to unpredictable results and considerable 
expenditure of judicial energy. 114 Where statutory construction fails 
to yield guidance, courts should recognize the constitutional policy 
to be served, 115 and should therefore lay. venue based on a pragmatic 
evaluation of where the factfinding process can be conducted most 
effectively. 
CONCLUSION 
Obstruction of justice cases should be tried where the defendant 
allegedly acted, not where the target proceedings were held. For-
malistic statutory· construction cannot resolve the venue problem; 
both the legislative history and the language of the statute are incon-
clusive. Deference to constitutional venue limitations, however, dic-
tates that venue should be laid where witnesses and evidence are 
most avail~ble; because factfinding in obstruction of justice cases 
will generally be more effective in the district where the obstructive 
acts took place, venue is properly laid in that district. 
113. By the time the district-of-the-crime test was framed, it was already apparent that 
attempts to apply it literally would lead to difficulty. See notes 78, 93-94 supra and accompa-
nying text. Today this approach leads to inconsistent results bearing no relation to any con-
ception of constitutional policy. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 7, 12 &· 13 supra. 
With common law and early statutory crimes it made sense to speak of "trial of facts in the 
vicinity where they happen" because the disputed facts would ordinarily concern whether the 
defendant did some proscribed act, with the requisite intent and without justification. The 
facts of intent, see, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 115-16 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); see generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 6, 
§ 28, at 202-03, and justifications, see generally id at§§ 47-57, could normally be inferred from 
the circumstances surrounding the act. The contested facts, then, form a nice little bundle with 
a definite locus. The crucial facts in a modem criminal trial may be a company's share of a 
product market, see, e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 
(1956), the going tariff on goods shipped between two points on a given date, see, e.g., Armour 
Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908), or the conformity of dentures to federal law, 
see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944). It is pointless to think in terms of 
where these facts "happen." It does, however, make sense to think in terms of "where" the 
proof, or at least substantial proof, of these facts is located. 
114. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 7, 12 & 13 supra. 
115. "In a criminal case, the question of venue is not merely a legal technicality but a 
significant matter of public policy." United States v. Black Cloud, 590 F.2d 270,273 (8th Cir. 
1979). 
